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A Note on the Computation of the Pre-Kernel for Permutation Games

Holger Meinhardt

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: To determine correctly a non-convex pre-kernel for TU games with more than 4 players can be a challenge full of possible pitfalls, even to the experienced researcher. Parts of the pre-kernel can be easily overlooked. In this note we discuss a method to present the full shape of the pre-kernel for a permutation game as discussed by Solymosi (2014). By using the property in which the pre-kernel is located in the least core for permutation games, the least core can be covered by a small collection of payoff equivalence classes as identified by Meinhardt (2013d) to finally establish the correct shape of the pre-kernel.

Keywords: Transferable; Utility; Game:; Non-Convex; Pre-Kernel:; Pre-Kernel; Catcher:; Convex; Analysis:; Fenchel-Moreau; Conjugation:; Indirect; Function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C71 D63 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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