Enterprise-level bargaining and labour productivity of Italian family firms: a quantile regression analysis

Mirella Damiani, Fabrizio Pompei and Andrea Ricci

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We investigate the role of Italian firms to evaluate their role on labour productivity performance. We find that family owned firms are less efficient than their no-family counterparts and also that family management negatively affects labour productivity. Furthermore, we estimate the role of firm level bargaining to verify whether family controlled firms, adopting these types of agreements, may partially close their efficiency gap with respect to their competitors. We find that enterprises under family governance obtain significant efficiency gains when they adopt firm level bargaining, greater than those obtained by their no-family counterparts.

Keywords: Family firms; corporate governance; labour productivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 G32 J3 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-eff and nep-lma
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