Airline strategic alliances in overlapping Markets: Should policymakers be concerned?

Philip Gayle () and Dave Brown

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: When there is significant overlap in potential partner airlines' route networks, policymakers have expressed concern that an alliance between such airlines may facilitate collusion on price and/or service levels in the partners' overlapping markets. The contribution of our paper is to put together a structural econometric model that is able to explicitly disentangle the demand and supply effects associated with an alliance between such airlines. The estimates from our structural econometric model do identify demand-increasing effects associated with the Delta/Continental/Northwest alliance, but statistically reject collusive behavior between the partners.

Keywords: Codeshare Alliance; Collusion; Airline Competition; Discrete Choice Demand Model; Nested Logit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L40 L93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-dcm and nep-tre
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62355/1/MPRA_paper_62355.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Airline strategic alliances in overlapping markets: Should policymakers be concerned? (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:62355

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().