Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma

Kenju Kamei

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A rich body of literature has proposed that pairs behave significantly differently from individuals due to a number of reasons such as group polarization. This paper experimentally compares cooperation behaviors between pairs and individuals in a finitely-repeated two-player public goods game (continuous prisoner’s dilemma game). We show that pairs contribute significantly more than individuals to their group accounts. Especially, when two pairs are matched with each other for the entire periods, they successfully build long-lasting cooperative relationships with their matched pairs. Our detailed analyses suggest that the enhanced cooperation behavior of pairs may be driven by (a) the mere fact that they have partners when they make decisions, (b) group polarization – those who initially prefer to contribute smaller amounts are more affected by the partners in their pairs, and (c) stronger conditional cooperation behavior of pairs to their matched pairs.

Keywords: experiment; cooperation; dilemma; team work; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-02-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-mfd and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62438/8/MPRA_paper_62438.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68413/16/MPRA_paper_68413.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62562/3/MPRA_paper_62562.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The power of joint decision-making in a finitely-repeated dilemma (2019)
Working Paper: Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:62438

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