Strategic Voting for Noncooperative Environmental Policies in Open Economies

Keisuke Hattori

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we construct a political-economy model of international noncooperative environmental policymaking, and examine the strategic incentives for voters to elect an environmental policymaker in open economies. We show that under several circumstances, citizens have an incentive to deliberately vote for a candidate whose environmental preferences differ from their own. Further, the strategic voting incentives are crucially depend on the environmental policy tools employed by the government, the international market structures, and the degree of product differentiation among firms.

Keywords: strategic voting; the race to the bottom; market structure; environmental policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D72 F18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-12-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-env and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic Voting for Noncooperative Environmental Policies in Open Economies (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:6333

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