Information Advantage in Stackelberg Duopoly under Demand Uncertainty

Jin Xu

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider a Stackelberg model under demand slope uncertainty in an environment where the follower owns information advantage. Specifically, we show that the second mover obtains higher expected profit than the first mover when the leader only knows the prior beliefs and the follower gains the posterior probabilities. This result tells us that the leadership advantage is dominated by the information advantage when demand fluctuation is important.

Keywords: Stackelberg; uncertainty; information advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:6408

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