Median and average as tools for measuring, electing and ranking: new prospects
Ruffin-Benoît Ngoie (),
Zoïnabo Savadogo and
Berthold E.-L. Ulungu
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
Impossibility theorems expose inconsistencies and paradoxes related to voting systems. Recently, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki proposed a new voting theory called Majority Judgment which tries to circumvent this limitation. In Majority Judgment, voters are invited to evaluate candidates in terms taken in a well-known common language. The winner is then the one that obtains the highest median. Since the Majority Judgment proposal was made, authors have detected insufficiencies with this new voting system. This article aims at reducing these insufficiencies by proposing a voting system to decide between the median-based voting and the mean-based one. It proposes, moreover, a new tie-breaking method computing intermedian ranks mean.
Keywords: Borda Majority Count; Majority Judgment; Mean-Median Compromise Method (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-08-07, Revised 2014-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
Published in Fundamental Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences 1.1(2014): pp. 9-30
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:64731
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