Tacit Collusion in Repeated Contests with Noise

James Boudreau () and Nicholas Shunda ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We analyze the determinants of tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated contest with noise in the contest success function. Sustaining collusion via Nash reversion strategies is easier the more noise there is, and is more difficult the larger is the contest's prize value. An increase in the contest's number of players can make sustaining collusion either more or less difficult.

Keywords: Contest; Conflict; Collusion; Noise (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:65671

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