How Does Privatization Work in China?

Chong-En Bai, Lu Jiangyong () and Zhigang Tao

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Using a comprehensive panel data set of China’s state-owned enterprises, we investigate the impacts of privatization, of different time sequences and extent of non-state ownership, on social welfare and firm performance. Attention has been focused on the sources of gain in firm performance and the long-run impacts of privatization. It is found that the privatization of China’s state-owned enterprises was achieved with limited compromise on social welfare responsibilities, and significant gain in firm performance was obtained by motivating the management and reducing agency cost at the management level.

JEL-codes: L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-dev and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Related works:
Journal Article: How does privatization work in China? (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:6599

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