Physician quality and payment schemes: A theoretical and empirical analysis

Renz Adrian Calub

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Physicians are expected to provide the best health care to their patients; however, it cannot be discounted that their practice is driven primarily by incentives. In this paper, we construct a physician utility maximization model that links physician quality to compensation schemes. Results show that relative to fixed payment, fee-for-service and mixed payment yield higher quality. Multinomial treatment effects regression of vignette scores on payment schemes also support this hypothesis, indicating that physicians are still below the best level of quality and that incentives to improve are still present.

Keywords: Physician; quality of healthcare; incentives; compensation schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 J44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea, nep-hrm and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/92604/2/MPRA_paper_66038.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:66038

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