A Unified Model of Spatial Price Discrimination

Konstantinos Eleftheriou and Nickolas Michelacakis

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We present a general model of mixed oligopoly, where competing firms exercise spatial price discrimination. Our findings indicate that the Nash equilibrium locations of firms are always socially optimal irrespective of the number of competitors, the level of privatization, the form of the transportation costs and the number and/or the varieties of the produced goods. An immediate implication of this result is that this form of competition is preferable from a welfare point of view.

Keywords: Mixed oligopoly; Social optimality; Spatial competition; Differentiated goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L32 L33 R32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-geo and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72106/1/MPRA_paper_72106.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/98328/1/MPRA_paper_98328.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:66557

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