Corporate governance structure and shareholder wealth maximisation

kwadwo Boateng Premepeh and Eugene Odartei-Mills

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Over the past two decades the ideology of shareholder value has become entrenched as a principle of corporate governance among companies. A well-established corporate governance system suggests effective control and accounting systems, stringent monitoring, effective regulatory mechanism and efficient utilisation of firms’ resources resulting in improved performance. The object of the research presented in this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the effects of corporate governance on shareholder value maximization of the listed companies in Ghana. Data from ten companies listed on Ghana Stock Exchange covering the period 2003 –2007 were used and analysis done within the panel data framework. The dependent variables, dividend per share and dividend yield are used as a measure of shareholder wealth maximization and the relation between corporate governance and shareholder wealth maximization is investigated. The regression results show that both the board size and the independence have statistically significant relationship with shareholder wealth maximization.

Keywords: Corporate governance; shareholder wealth; dividend; wealth maximization; Ghana Stock Exchange. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc and nep-cse
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Published in SK International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research Hub 3.2(2015): pp. 8-30

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