Charity Auctions for the Happy Few

Olivier Bos

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Recent literature has shown that all-pay auctions raise more money for charity than either winner-pay auctions or lotteries. We demonstrate that first-price and second-price winner- pay auctions have a better revenue performance than first-price and second-price all-pay auctions when bidders are sufficiently asymmetric. Lotteries can also provide higher revenue than all-pay auctions. To prove this, we consider a framework with complete information. Complete information is helpful and may reflect events that occur, for instance, in a local service club (such as a voluntary organization) or at a show-business dinner.

Keywords: All-pay auctions; charity; complete information; externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D62 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68212/1/MPRA_paper_68212.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Charity auctions for the happy few (2016)
Working Paper: Charity auctions for the happy few (2016)
Working Paper: Charity Auctions for the Happy Few (2010)
Working Paper: Charity Auctions for the Happy Few (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:68212

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