Evolutionary Justification of Plagiarism

Alexander Karpov

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper provides evolutionary game theoretic model of plagiarism. The paper finds the relationship between author effort, publication value, and the frequency of plagiarism. There are two types of equilibria. Plagiarist-free equilibria are neutrally stable. The only evolutionary stable state is characterized by a positive share of plagiarists.

Keywords: plagiarism; replication dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 I23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-sog
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:70976

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