Strategic Voting with Almost Perfect Signals

Andrea Venturini

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A standard assumption in the literature of strategic voting is the independence of signals. Each juror observes a signal at the interim stage of the game. Then she votes according to her private information in order to maximize her expected utility. This work introduces a dependency between signals, reflecting a more realistic situation, in which evidences can be incontrovertible. We give a full characterization of the symmetric equilibria in non-weakly dominated strategies and we provide a benchmark between the classical approach and this new one.

Keywords: Voting; Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; Condorcet Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-pr~ and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:71216

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