Who bears the burden of bribery? Evidence from Public Service Delivery in Kenya

Michael Mbate

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper empirically examines how an individual’s economic, social and political capital affects the propensity to make bribe payments in exchange for public services. Using an individual-level survey on bribes, the econometric results suggest that the burden of bribery is borne by the poor, but substantially decreases when institutions that constrain bureaucratic corruption are strong and effective. The results also show that bribery incidences decrease when social capital is high but increase when political networks are prevalent. These findings support the need to combine anti-corruption reforms with poverty reduction strategies in order to foster equity in public services provision in Kenya.

Keywords: Poverty; Bribery; Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-dev, nep-pol and nep-soc
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71654/1/MPRA_paper_71654.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Who bears the burden of bribery? Evidence from public service delivery in Kenya (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:71654

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