Training, quality of management and firm level bargaining

Mirella Damiani and Andrea Ricci

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Abstract The double aim of this paper is to investigate the link between firm training behaviour and the adoption of performance-related pay (PRP) and to verify how the quality of management contributes to explaining the strength of this link. Using Ordinary Least Squares Estimates and Fixed Effect Estimates for a sample of Italian firms, we find that training is a significant determinant of firm level bargaining on PRP. Furthermore, we find that managerial quality plays a significant positive role and suggest that this is because managerial quality favours the evolution of social norms based on wage bonuses that enhance trust, sustain collaborative relationships and motivate co-workers to train each other. Jel Classifications: M53; M52; J50; I20

Keywords: Keywords: Training; Compensation; Management; Education (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J3 J33 M52 M53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-06-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-hrm and nep-lma
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