Distributional Neutral Welfare Ranking-Extending Pareto Principle

Sugata Marjit and Sandip Sarkar ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The well known Pareto criterion used in the context of efficiency and welfare has to do with absolute changes whereas in every domain of economic behavior inequality or relative changes has become a major concern. We propose an inequality-preserving or distribution neutral Pareto criterion-the strong Pareto superior or SPS allocation which preserves the initial distribution and makes everyone better off. Our main result is that whenever there is a gain in the aggregate value of the relevant attribute, there exists a unique counterfactual allocation which is SPS.

Keywords: Strong Pareto Superiority; Inequality; Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D63 F10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-09-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
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Related works:
Working Paper: Distribution-neutral Welfare Ranking-Extending Pareto Principle (2017)
Working Paper: Distributional Neutral Welfare Ranking-Extending Pareto Principle (2016)
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