Fraud Detection, Conservatism and Political Economy of Whistle Blowing

Peterson Ozili

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper presents a discussion on whistle-blowing and take the view that whistle-blowing is an important fraud detection technique. A discussion of some factors that influence the whistle-blowers’ incentive to blow the whistle or to remain silent in the face of persuasive fraud red flags, is also presented. The paper suggests that the tradeoff between the cost and benefit of whistle-blowing may compel the whistle-blower to apply some degree of conservatism in their whistle-blowing activities. Also, some discussion on how whistle-blowing might be influenced by firm-level politics, country-level political economy, firm ownership and other institutional factors is presented. Finally, although the provision of incentives can increase the appeal to encourage whistle-blowing, the appeal to blow the whistle may be weakened when the whistle-blower takes into account the larger context that influence the decision to blow the whistle or to remain silent.

Keywords: Forensic Accounting; Fraud Detection; Whistle Blowing; Politics; Conservatism; Ownership Control; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M4 M41 M42 M48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Forthcoming in Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 3.5(2016): pp. 17-24

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74982/1/MPRA_paper_74982.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:74982

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().