Heterogeneity in Guessing Games: An Experiment

Tianwei Liu

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In interactions under strategic complementarity, naive players have a disproportionally large effect on the aggregate outcome, resulting in a nonlinear relationship between the proportion of sophisticated and naive players and the aggregate outcome. This paper studies this relationship in a beauty contest game by informing some players the game theoretic solution and systematically varying the proportion of informed players. The results show that the conditions predicted by strategic complementarity stand empirical test.

Keywords: Beauty contest; Strategic complementarity; Beliefs; Bounded rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D03 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76072/8/MPRA_paper_76072.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:75001

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