It's your turn: experiments with three-player public good games

Yohanes Riyanto and Nilanjan Roy

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We report results from experiments designed to investigate the prevalence of turn-taking in three-person finitely repeated threshold public good games without communication. Individuals can each make a discrete contribution. If the number of contributors is at least equal to the threshold, a public benefit accrues to all group members. Players take turns to provide the public good each round when the endowments are homogeneous. When the turn-taking path is at odds with efficiency or under private information of endowments, players seldom engage in taking turns. An endogenous-move protocol limits the frequency of mis-coordinated outcomes every round.

Keywords: Public good provision; Turn-taking; Repeated game; Endogenous move; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D03 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-02-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:76565

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