Corporate Voting

Alan Miller

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: I introduce a model of corporate voting. I characterize the shareholder majority rule as the unique corporate voting rule that satisfies four axioms: anonymity, neutrality, share monotonicity, and merger, a property that requires consistency in election outcomes following stock-for-stock mergers.

Keywords: Corporate voting; axioms; shareholder majority rule; quotas rules; merger; one share-one vote (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:79185

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