Principle-Agent Analysis of Technology Project (LINCOS) in Costa Rica

Dawood Mamoon and SIlvia Hernandez

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the institutional arrangement between various actors to understand how ICT project objectives flow among actors in a standard LINCOS project and how they would affect the sustainability and effectiveness of LINCOS in particular and an ICT project in general. Since there are many actors involved in different stages and processes of a single LINCOS project, the paper analyses the bilateral and multilateral relationships among these actors to understand the factors that might affect the efficiency of the ICT project. In other words the paper looks at the actors involved in a LINCOS project in an effort to capture those circumstances under which a LINCOS project is exposed to principal- agent problems.

Keywords: Technology; Game theory; Project Evaluation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O19 O22 O32 O33 O35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-ppm
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Journal Article: Principle-agent analysis of technology project (LINCOS) in Costa Rica (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:82010

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