Why it makes economic sense to help the have-nots in times of a financial crisis
Kees De Koning ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
August 9, 2007 is often regarded as the starting date of the global financial crisis. BNP Paribas stopped trading in three of its investment funds exposed to the U.S. sub-prime mortgage markets as the liquidity in these markets had all but dried up. Liquidity considerations are a symptom of the supply side of funds: the lenders’ side. The latter could be banks, hedge funds, asset managers or pension funds, but equally rich individuals who would invest directly in these markets. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 was a lenders’ crisis. Generally, banks had insufficient capital to absorb the losses created by the reduced liquidity levels in the financial markets. Central banks had to step in to rescue quite a few of them. The fact was, however, that the underlying cause of the financial crisis was a borrowers’ crisis. In the U.S., over the years 1997-2007, households had to borrow an ever-growing percentage of their earnings in order to get themselves on the property ladder or rent a home. Long before 2007, in fact by 2003, the additional amount that a household had to borrow to get a home was equal to a full year of earnings. Average income growth and mortgage volume growth were on a collision course. Borrowers had to allocate increasing percentages of their earnings to servicing mortgage debts or renting a home. The notion that lenders will rein in their lending as a consequence of free market competition is a fallacy. The key is not the price of funds borrowed, but the volume of funds lend per time period in comparison to average household’ nominal income growth. The consequences of a borrowers’ crisis are different from a financial markets’ liquidity one. When households have to allocate an increasing share of their income to either buy or rent a home, fewer funds are available to spend on other goods and services. When households are subsequently confronted with foreclosure and ultimately repossession of homes, they lose most or all past savings accumulated in the home. The poor get poorer, both in income and asset values terms. The gap between the haves and the have-nots widens dramatically. Volume of lending control and to some extent rent controls can prevent a new financial crisis occurring. More measures are needed to overcome a borrowers’ crisis.
Keywords: financial crisis; lenders' crisis; borrowers' crisis; income-house price gap; U.S. mortgage lending levels 1996-2016; annual U.S.housing starts; average U.S. home sales price; median U.S. annual household' income; economic versus legal solutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E3 E4 E44 E5 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-08-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-mac and nep-pke
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/82035/22/MPRA_paper_82035.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Why it makes economic sense to help the have-nots in times of a financial crisis (2017) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:82035
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().