Régime de Tarification de l'Input dans un modèle avec Innovation de Produit en Amont et en Aval

Input Pricing in a Model with Upstream and Downstream Product Innovation

Moez El Elj

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the incentives for improving-quality R&D in a two-tier marketstructure where the quality of a differentiated good depends on the specific R&D of a downstream oligopoly and the R&D of an upstream monopoly. We show that input pricing is determining for the incentives for innovation in upstream and downstream industry. Fixed price agreements promote innovation in downstream and upstream industry by eliminating the opportunistic behaviour of the input supplier and are welfare enhancing. Theses agreements are all the more effective as the weight of the quality of the input in the consumer’s perception of the total quality of the final good is significant and as the goods are strongly differentiated.

Keywords: Product Innovation; Vertical Market - Technological Spillovers - Input pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-04-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-mic, nep-mkt and nep-tid
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:8237

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