Capital Structure and Oligarch Ownership

Demid Chernenko

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This study examines the effects of oligarch ownership on corporate capital structures. Using panel data from Ukraine, I find that oligarch-owned companies employ significantly more debt and liabilities than their peers. However, there is no direct relation between oligarch ownership and target capital structure. Whereas the determinants of target leverage are similar across all owners, differences in firm characteristics also have a fairly small effect. I show that larger leverage is due to better access to debt, which results in lower rebalancing costs and faster restructurings of oligarch-owned companies. The findings clearly suggest that oligarchs benefit from the accumulated advantages.

Keywords: Capital Structure; Leverage; Oligarchs; Influential Ownership; Connected Firms; Cumulative Advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 P31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-cis and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Capital structure and oligarch ownership (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:83641

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