On some decisive players for linear efficient and symmetric values in cooperative games with transferable utility

Chameni Nembua Célestin and Miamo Clovis

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The main goal of the paper is to shed light on economic allocations issues, in particular by focusing on individuals who receive nothing (that is an amount of zero allocation or payoff). It is worth noting that such individuals may be considered, in some contexts, as poor or socially excluded. To this end, our study relies on the notion of cooperative games with transferable utility and the Linear Efficient and Symmetric values (called LES values) are considered as allocation rules. Null players in Shapley sense are extensively studied ; two broader classes of null players are introduced. The analysis is facilitated by the help of a parametric representation of LES values. It is clearly shown that the control of what a LES value assigns as payoffs to null players gives significant information about the characterization of the value. Several axiomatic characterizations of subclasses of LES values are provided using our approach.

Keywords: TU-game; Linear Efficient and Symmetric value; Null players; Average null players; Shapley value; Solidarity value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D31 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017, Revised 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/83670/1/MPRA_paper_83670.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:83670

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().