Proportional Shapley levels values
Manfred Besner
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
The proportional Shapley value (Besner 2016; Béal et al. 2017; Gangolly 1981) is an proportional counterpart to the Shapley value (Shapley 1953b) in cooperative games. As shown in Besner (2017a), the proportional Shapley value is a convincing non-linear alternative, especially in cost allocation, if the stand alone worths of the players are plausible weights. To enable similar properties for cooperative games with a level structure, we generalize this value. Therefore we adapt the proceeding applied to the weighted Shapley values in Besner (2017b). We present, analogous to the four classes of weighted Shapley levels values in Besner (2017b), four different values, the proportional Shapley hierarchy levels value, the proportional Shapley support levels value, the proportional Shapley alliance levels value and the proportional Shapley collaboration levels value, respectively.
Keywords: Cooperative; game; ·; Level; structure; ·; (Proportional); Shapley; (levels); value; ·; Proportionality; ·; Component; substitution; ·; Dividends (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/87120/1/MPRA_paper_87120.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:87120
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().