Publicly provided private goods: education and selective vouchers

Amedeo Piolatto

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The literature on vouchers often concludes that a vouchers-based system cannot be the outcome of a majority vote. This paper shows that, when the value of vouchers and who is entitled to receive them are fixed exogenously, the majority of voters are in favour of selective vouchers. On top of that, as long as the introduction of vouchers does not undermine the existence of the public school system, introducing selective vouchers induces a Pareto improvement. Middle class agents are the only one using vouchers in equilibrium, while the poorest agents in the economy profit from the reduction in public school congestion.

Keywords: public economics; education; vouchers; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 H42 I2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-edu, nep-hrm, nep-pbe and nep-ure
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8934/1/MPRA_paper_8934.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14005/2/MPRA_paper_14005.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19407/1/MPRA_paper_19407.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Education and selective vouchers (2010)
Working Paper: Education and selective vouchers (2010)
Working Paper: Education and selective vouchers (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:8934

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