Focality is intuitive - Experimental evidence on the effects of time pressure in coordination games

Axel Sonntag and Anders Poulsen ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We experimentally examine the effects of varying time pressure in a coordination game with a label salient focal equilibrium. We consider both a pure coordination game (payoff symmetry) and a battle of the sexes game with conflict of interest (payoff asymmetry). In symmetric games, there are no effects of time pressure, since the label-salient outcome is highly focal regardless of how much time subjects have to decide. In asymmetric games, less time results in greater focality of the the label-salient action, and it becomes significantly more likely that any coordination is on the focal outcome.

Keywords: coordination game; focal point; time pressure; response times; social heuristics hypothesis; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Related works:
Working Paper: Focality is Intuitive - Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Time Pressure in Coordination Games (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:92262

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