On the Maximum Number of Players Voluntarily Contributing to Two or More Public Goods

Shintaro Nakagawa

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Cornes and Itaya (2010) showed that in a two-player game of voluntary provision of two public goods if the players have different preferences, and if both players simultaneously make positive contributions to both public goods, the system of equations representing the Nash equilibrium is overdetermined. We extend this proposition to a model of voluntary provision of two or more public goods and show that if the players have different preferences, and if the number of players who contribute simultaneously to two or more public goods is more than the number of public goods, the system representing the Nash equilibrium is overdetermined. This result implies that in a large group, the share of players contributing to multiple public goods may well be quite small and the majority of the players may contribute to at the most one public good.

Keywords: Voluntary provision; multiple public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-03-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-pub
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