Optimal Price of Entry into a Competition

Boris Ginzburg

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A continuum of agents are choosing whether to enter a competition. Entry is controlled by a firm that charges a price for it. The mass of agents is uncertain. I analyse how the distribution of the mass of agents determines the equilibrium price and the intensity of entry. A shift of the distribution towards more mass initially induces a reduction of price, and later – a reduction in entry.

Keywords: contests; entry; university admission tests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/96367/1/MPRA_paper_96367.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/99092/1/MPRA_paper_99092.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: OPTIMAL PRICE OF ENTRY INTO A COMPETITION (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:96367

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