The Financing Dilemma Supporting a Project

Joseph Mullat ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this note, we will deal with one of the simplest cases of player-formed coalitions, all of which can be considered as “outstanding” in terms of bounded rationality. Bounded rationality is the idea that rational decision making of people is limited by people’s irrational nature. We focused on special coalitions, called "Kernels", that have an advantage over the remaining, due to yielding higher contribution of each individual participant.

Keywords: coalition; game; contribution; donation; monotonic; project (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C51 C53 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ore and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:96879

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