Understanding Tax Corruption in Transition Economies: Evidence from Bulgaria

Konstantin Pashev

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Measures of corruption are based on the concept of bribes as extra business costs. Drawing evidence from corruption surveys of business and tax service in Bulgaria, this paper looks at the bribe as a price paid by the taxpayer in exchange for income-maximizing services supplied by corrupt tax officials. It distinguishes between corruption for tax evasion and corruption related to excessive voluntary compliance costs. The latter is closer to the concept of bribes as costs imposed on business, but is limited in scale relative to the former. It is in this framework that the study analyses the drivers of the demand and supply of corruption “services” and proposes an indicator framework for “sizing up” the problem, evaluating the strength of the underlying factors and formulating anti-corruption policies whose effect can be monitored and evaluated using that framework.

Keywords: tax; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-pbe, nep-reg and nep-tra
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Published in NISPAcee occational papers No. 1 Winter 2006.VII(2006): pp. 3-29

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:974

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