Indikátory hlasovací síly v Evropské unii

Voting power indicators in the European union

Marek Loužek

Politická ekonomie, 2004, vol. 2004, issue 3, 291-312

Abstract: The article is concerned with voting indicators in the European Union. The first chapter constructs a model of voting power and defines four indicators: A. Simple relative power, B. Shapley-Shubik index, C. Banzhaf index, D. Coleman index. The second chapter defines data: the voting structure according the Nice Treaty and nine algorithms - variants of the EU enlargement. The third chapter summarizes empirical results. The fourth chapter discusses statistical relations between voting indicators. The fifth chapter brings conclusions.

Keywords: game theory; EU enlargement; voting indicator; quantitative analysis; index of power; minimal winning coalitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C12 C43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.461

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