Dynamically Aggregating Diverse Information

Annie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu and Vasilis Syrgkanis
Additional contact information
Annie Liang: Northwestern University
Xiaosheng Mu: Princeton University
Vasilis Syrgkanis: Microsoft Research

Working Papers from Princeton University. Economics Department.

Abstract: An agent has access to multiple information sources, each modeled as a Brownian motion whose drift provides information about a different component of an unknown Gaussian state. Information is acquired continuously—where the agent chooses both which sources to sample from, and also how to allocate attention across them—until an endogenously chosen time, at which point a decision is taken. We demonstrate conditions on the agent’s prior belief under which it is possible to exactly characterize the optimal information acquisition strategy. We then apply this characterization to derive new results regarding: (1) endogenous information acquisition for binary choice, (2) the dynamic consequences of attention manipulation, and (3) strategic information provision by biased news sources.

Keywords: information; aggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:econom:2021-43

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