Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions

Marina Agranov, Ahrash Dianat, Larry Samuelson and Leeat Yariv
Additional contact information
Marina Agranov: California Institute of Technology
Ahrash Dianat: University of Essex
Larry Samuelson: Yale University
Leeat Yariv: Princeton University

Working Papers from Princeton University. Economics Department.

Abstract: We experimentally study decentralized one-to-one matching markets with transfers. We vary the information available to participants, complete or incomplete, and the surplus structure, supermodular or submodular. Several insights emerge. First, while markets often culminate in efficient matchings, stability is more elusive, reflecting the difficulty of arranging attendant transfers. Second, incomplete information and submodularity present hurdles to efficiency and especially stability, their combination drastically diminishes stability's likelihood. Third, matchings form "from the top down" in complete-information supermodular markets, but exhibit many more and less-obviously ordered offers otherwise. Last, participants' market positions matter far more than their dynamic bargaining styles for outcomes.

Keywords: matching; incomplete information; stability; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-des, nep-exp and nep-mst
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:econom:2021-74

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