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Dominance Solvability in Random Games

Noga Alon, Kirill Rudov and Leeat Yariv
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Noga Alon: Princeton University
Kirill Rudov: Princeton University
Leeat Yariv: Princeton University

Working Papers from Princeton University. Economics Department.

Abstract: We study the effectiveness of iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions in random two-player games. We show that dominance solvability of games is vanishingly small as the number of at least one player’s actions grows. Furthermore, conditional on dominance solvability, the number of iterations required to converge to Nash equilibrium grows rapidly as action sets grow. Nonetheless, at least when one of the players has a small action set, iterated elimination simplifies the game substantially by ruling out a sizable fraction of actions. This is no longer the case as both players’ action sets expand. With more than two players, iterated elimination becomes even less potent in altering the game players need to consider. Technically, we illustrate the usefulness of recent combinatorial methods for the analysis of general games.

Keywords: Random Games; Dominance Solvability; Iterated Elimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:econom:2021-84

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