Agency Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration

Jonathan Eaton and Harvey Rosen
Additional contact information
Harvey Rosen: Princeton University

No 533, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.

Abstract: In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of "bonding" executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards actions that are in the 1ong-run interest of the stockholders. Firms must take into account (1) their ability to discern unfortunate circumstances from mismanagement; (2) the extent to which a compensation package forces the executive to face risks beyond his control; and (3) the willingness of a given executive to bear this risk. we use our theory to interpret some executive compensation data from the early 1970's.

JEL-codes: M31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1982-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://dataspace.princeton.edu/bitstream/88435/dsp012f75r801f/1/153.pdf
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Internal Server Error

Related works:
Journal Article: Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration (1983)
Working Paper: Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration (1981)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:indrel:153

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bobray Bordelon ().