Union Success in Representation Elections: Why Does Unit Size Matter?

Henry Farber
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Henry Farber: Princeton University

Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.

Abstract: I establish four facts regarding the pattern of NLRB supervised representation election activity over the past 45 years: 1) the quantity of election activity has fallen sharply and discontinuously since the mid-70's after increasing between the mid-1950's and the mid-1970's; 2) union success in elections held has declined less sharply, though continuously, over the entire period; 3) it has always been the case that unions have been less likely to win NLRB-supervised representation elections in large units than in small units; and 4) the size-gap in union success-rates has widened substantially over the last forty years. I develop a simple optimizing model of the union decision to hold a representation election that can account for the first three facts. I provide a pair of competing explanations for the fourth fact: one based on differential behavior by employers of different sizes and one purely statistical. I then develop and estimate three empirical models of election outcomes using data on NLRB elections over the 1952-98 time period in order to determine whether the simple statistical model can account for the size pattern of union win rates over time. I conclude that systematic union-selection of targets for organization combined with the purely statistical factors can largely account for the observed patterns.

Keywords: empirical model; union election outcomes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N76 N77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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