The statistical association between central bank independence and inflation

T.F. Cargill
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T.F. Cargill: University of Nevada

BNL Quarterly Review, 1995, vol. 48, issue 193, 159-172

Abstract: The importance traditionally given to the direct and positive relationship between central bank autonomy and the inflation rate is negated by results of a study of two leading banking institutions. The subject banks are the Bank of Japan which is dependent on other government institutions and the Federal Reserve which is relatively independent. Regression analysis of data shows that the Japanese bank performed much better in inflation control than the latter despite the latter's freedom to set the long-run inflation rate.

Keywords: Federal Reserve Banks; Monetary Authorities - Central Bank; Inflation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E31 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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