Structural biases in prudential regulation of banks

Mario Tonveronachi ()
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Mario Tonveronachi: Universitˆ degli Studi di Siena, Dipartimento di economia politica, Siena (Italy)

BNL Quarterly Review, 2001, vol. 54, issue 219, 341-353

Abstract: According to Mario Tonveronachi, the Basle rules produce distortions that are no less serious than those attributed to the former structural regulation. Excessive competition is no less harmful than low competition, the level playing field approach helps the large dimension and Òtoo big to failÓ results, capital crunches produce serious effects on the economy while the regulatory costs go on absorbing important resources in small banks. It is a matter for further research to verify if the new approach to regulation has also fostered an increase in the part of GDP absorbed by the financial system without bringing about a better distribution of risks and a proportionate increase in what James Tobin (1984) termed full-insurance efficiency

Keywords: Bank; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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