A Random Matching Theory

C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera and D. Puzzelo

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We develop the theoretical underpinnings of pairwise random matching mechanisms. We formalize the mechanics of matching, and study the links between properties of the different mechanisms and trade frictions. A particular emphasis is placed on providing exact mappings between matching technologies and informational constraints.

Keywords: Random matching; frictions; anonymous trading; spatial intersections; search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C00 C78 D83 E00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2004-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: A random matching theory (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1168

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