Cooperative Strategies in Groups of Strangers: An Experiment

Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari and Maria Bigoni

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study cooperation in four-person economies of indefinite duration. Subjects interact anonymously playing a prisoner s dilemma. We identify and characterize the strategies employed at the aggregate and at the individual level. We find that (i) grim trigger well describes aggregate play, but not individual play; (ii) individual behavior is persistently heterogeneous; (iii) coordination on cooperative strategies does not improve with experience; (iv) systematic defection does not crowd-out systematic cooperation.

Keywords: repeated games; equilibrium selection; prisoners dilemma; random matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41
Date: 2010-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1237

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