Economic Arguments in U.S. Antitrust and EU Competition Policy: Two Roads Diverged

Stephen Martin ()

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, I compare economic arguments in U.S. Supreme Court antitrust and EU Court of Justice competition policy decisions on four topics: refusal to deal, predation, vertical contracts, and hor- izontal interfirm relations.

Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2010-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-eur
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://business.purdue.edu/research/Working-papers-series/2010/1257.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1257

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Business PHD ().