Behavioral Antitrust

Stephen Martin ()

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this chapter, I review the rational economic man model and contrast it with evidence of bounded rationality that has emerged since the last quarter of the previous century. I discuss the implications of bounded rationality for research in industrial economics, with particular attention to the analysis of predation, collusion, and entry. I conclude by drawing implications for the antitrust rules toward dominant firm behavior that come out of the Matsushita and Brooke Group decisions.

Keywords: behavioral economics; antitrust; predation; collusion; entry. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D9 L1 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 66 pages
Date: 2017-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-com, nep-evo, nep-hme, nep-hpe, nep-ind and nep-law
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Related works:
Chapter: Behavioral antitrust (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1297

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