Entrepreneurship And Asymmetric Information In Input Markets

Robin Boadway and Motohiro Sato
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Motohiro Sato: Hitotsubashi University

No 1069, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: Entrepreneurs starting new firms face two sorts of asymmetric information problems. Information about the quality of new investments may be private, leading to adverse selection in credit markets. And, entrepreneurs may not observe the quality of workers applying for jobs, resulting in adverse selection in labor markets. We construct a simple model to illustrate some consequences of new firms facing both sorts of asymmetric information. Multiple equilibria can occur. Stable equilibria can be in the interior, or at a corner in which no entrepreneurs enter. Stable interior equilibria can involve involuntary unemployment, as well as credit rationing. Equilibrium outcomes mismatch workers to firms, and will generally result in an inefficient number of new firms. With involuntary unemployment, there will be too few new firms, but with full employment, there may be too many or too few. Taxes or subsidies on new firms and employment can be used to achieve a second-best optimum. Alternative information assumptions are explored.

Keywords: entrepreneurship; asymmetric information; adverse selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G14 H25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2006-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-ent, nep-fin, nep-fmk and nep-pbe
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https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/qed_wp_1069.pdf First version 2006 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Entrepreneurship and asymmetric information in input markets (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1069

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