The Control Of Land Rent In The Fortified Farming Town

John Hartwick

No 1096, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: We consider costly administration at the center of a farming community surrounding a fortified village. Land rent taxation is high cost mode of financing central administration in atax incidence sense. Participatory administration by the governed is a lower cost alternative. We speculate why the low cost option has been out-competed by its higher cost alternative throughout history. We also take up constraints on predation on farmers by a landlord at the center.

Keywords: administrative structure; public goods; welfare cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2006-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-his, nep-pbe and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/qed_wp_1096.pdf First version 2006 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1096

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mark Babcock ().