Work-related Perks, Agency Problems, And Optimal Incentive Contracts

Anthony Marino and Jan Zabojnik ()

No 1107, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Keywords: Job Perks; Agency Problems; Optimal Incentive Contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J3 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2006-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/qed_wp_1107.pdf First version 2006 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Work‐related perks, agency problems, and optimal incentive contracts (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1107

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