Disobedience And Authority

Anthony Marino, John Matsusaka and Jan Zabojnik ()

No 1109, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Keywords: Delegation; Authority; Separation Costs; Optimal employment contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J63 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 0 pages
Date: 2006-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1109

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